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PANEL II: SECRECY AND
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Aaron Twerski*
Unlike criminal litigation, where the government is the plaintiff
and there often exists a clear, unmistakable public interest need for
secrecy, civil litigation involves a dispute between a private
plaintiff and defendant - or a set of private plaintiffs, when dealing
in cases of mass tort - that engages the judicial process. There has
been huge debate in the literature about the appropriateness of
secrecy in civil litigation,' because it raises questions as to whom
the courts belong. Can, or should, private parties be able to enter
into agreements, either voluntarily or with the blessing of the court
through protective orders, concerning discovery or sealing orders
with regard to judicial proceedings and secrecy orders concerning
settlements?
There is both a philosophical and a jurisprudential debate about
the subject. The debate almost entirely surrounds the issue of the
importance of settlements, and whether or not secrecy is, in many
cases, an absolute necessity in order to move a settlement negotia-
tion along or complete a negotiation. Behind settlement issues
resides an even more profound debate, almost ancillary to this
discussion, as to whether settlement should play such a significant
role in private litigation. Certainly, the work of Professor Owen
Fiss suggests that we have placed too much emphasis on settle-
ment.2
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
See generally Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
283 (1999); Andrew D. Miller, Federal Antisecrecy Legislation: A Model Act to
Safeguard the Public from Court Sanctioned Hidden Hazards, 20 B.C. ENVTL.
L. REv. 371 (1993); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and
Access to the Courts, 105 HARv. L. REv. 427 (1991).
2 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082-90 (1984)
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To discuss the subject, the practical effects, and both the
judicial and legislative responses, we have brought together an
outstanding panel. I will not mention the backgrounds of each of
the distinguished members of the panel. Their vitae appear in the
program handed out to the audience upon arrival.
We are privileged to have Judge Jack B. Weinstein, who truly
needs no introduction to this audience; Professor Jack H. Frieden-
thal from the George Washington School of Law, who is a
preeminent legal scholar and expert in the field of civil procedure;
Sheila L. Birnbaum, who is one of the leading authorities in the
field of torts and products liability and a chief litigator in the
products liability practice group at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher
& Flom; and our own alumnus, Harvey Weitz, an outstanding
personal injury lawyer who brings a wealth of experience to this
discussion.
I feel I must bow to the seniority and the prestige of the
judiciary, by asking Judge Weinstein to lead off the discussion.
(arguing that settlement is a capitulation where consent is often coerced, that the
absence of a trial and judgment makes subsequent judicial involvement
troublesome and that although settlement may streamline dockets, justice may not
be done since disparity in the financial resources of the parties infects the
bargaining process).
SECRECY IN CIVIL TRIALS:
SOME TENTATIVE VIEWS
Hon. Jack B. Weinstein*
I start from the principle that everything in court should be
public and nothing secret except the internal chambers discussions
by judges with their clerks and various drafts of opinions. The
assumption that all aspects of court-centered litigation are out in
the open, on the record, and fully explained by the court is an
important foundation for the confidence our public has in its courts.
Our work differs from the closed door deals of the executive and
legislative branches. Any sacrifice of confidence by shuttering off
part of the sunshine through secrecy orders needs careful consider-
ation and justification. No one or a few such orders will debilitate
the satisfaction of our citizenry with the courts; but it is easy to
slip into addiction, thus sapping a main source of our Republic's
health.
That said, the problems become more difficult when we move
from high principle to the nuts and bolts of litigation. As a nuts
and bolts nisi prius judge, I have signed a fair number of secrecy
orders. After signing such orders, I have sometimes modified the
order to reveal sealed materials.
The issues of secrecy and confidentiality in civil (as well as
criminal) litigation have become more complex since I first
addressed them in the Agent Orange cases,' a number of banking
suits,2 and in my book on mass tort litigation.3 This change is
* Senior Judge, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York.
1 See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y.
1985). See generally PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS
Toxic DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1987).
2 See, e.g., In re Joint E. and S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710
(E.D.N.Y. & S.D.N.Y. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 982 F.2d 721 (2d Cir.
1992).
' JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE
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sparked by the enormous increase in data collected and available
through computers, the ease of widespread transmission via the
internet and e-mail, and because individual, national and interna-
tional enterprises and governments are collecting, analyzing, and
using this data in more sophisticated ways. By contrast, the
increasing use of alternative dispute resolution keeps the disputes
and facts underlying them out of court and thus out of the public
eye.4
Typically, data on consumer desires, buying habits, credit
history, and the like are being obtained and analyzed by purveyors
of mass products. Even the state licensing authorities are selling
their names and numbers.' We face the likelihood that DNA
analysis will be used in criminal investigations and prosecutions
through state and federal data banks that could be accumulated
from infancy on and utilized in such matters as employment and
insurance opportunities. Should those whose data is collected have
a right to control it before it is released in civil cases of no interest
to them? How should adoptions and juvenile court information be
treated?7 These are related matters not being discussed today.
EFFECT OF CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY
DEVICES (1995).
4 See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
Through ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 246 (1996) (noting that the
growth of private dispute resolution possesses the ability to "stunt the common
law's development as entire areas of law are removed from the courts" and "to
deprive the public of important information"); Jack B. Weinstein, International
Aspects of Alternative Dispute Resolution, Address Before the International
Conference on Mediation and Arbitration in Nicosia, Cyprus (Apr. 8, 2000).
' See Reno v. Condon, 120 S. Ct. 666, 668 (2000) (upholding the
constitutionality of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act, which restricts the ability
of states to disclose personal information of drivers without their consent).
6 See, e.g., Genetic Information in the Workplace: Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong., available at
2000 WL 23831630 (July 20, 2000) (statement of Steven Paul Miller, Comm'r,
U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n); Speeding DNA Evidence
Processing: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Crime, 106th Cong., available at 2000 WL 11070102 (Mar. 23, 2000) (statement
of Barry Steinhard, Assoc. Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union).
7 See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Debate on Adoptees' Rights Stirs Oregon,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Al (highlighting the controversy over a state law
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In the tobacco cases, I recently utilized, in a jurisdiction
opinion, huge masses of data collected in the Minnesota tobacco
litigations and released by Congress on the Internet.8 A magistrate
judge is deciding what may be thousands of individual privilege
claims to this tobacco data that is available to the world, but
perhaps should not be seen by our juries.
The United States and the European Union have just finalized
a data privacy agreement.9 It includes "a set of standards that U.S.
companies can apply to comply with the EU directive, which
prohibits EU-based companies from transferring personally
identifiable data to third countries, including the United States, that
do not provide 'adequate' privacy protection. ' Moreover,
[t]he safe harbor principles would require U.S. companies
to provide notice to EU consumers of what data is collect-
ed about them via Web sites or otherwise. In addition,
participating companies would have to ask for consent to
the data collection, give consumers choice on whether the
data can be sold or licensed to third parties, and ensure
that EU consumers have 'reasonable access to personal
information about them that an organization holds' and can
amend that information when it is inaccurate.11
This compact may give rise to civil suits with the release of vast
amounts of information.
One problem that has been of particular concern to me is the
lawyer's obligation to maintain client confidences. Even judges
sometimes feel an obligation of privacy in their actions, as
illustrated by Chief Judge Posner's statement of confidentiality in
the negotiations on giving up an attempt to mediate the Microsoft-
that disregards any request for anonymity by opening adoption records for those
seeking to determine the identity of their birth parents).
8 Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 2d 95, 100 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). To
view the documents released by the United States government, see Chairman
Bliley Releases Subpoenaed Tobacco Documents to the American People,
available at http://www.house.gov/commerce/TobaccoDocs/documents.html.
9 See Joseph Kirwin & Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., EU Finalize Data Privacy
Accord Establishing Voluntary Safe Harbor, 68 U.S.L.W. 2568 (Mar. 28, 2000).
10 Id. at 2568.
11 Id.
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Department of Justice antitrust dispute. 2 In the area of secrecy it
becomes impossible to discuss the lawyer's secrecy obligations
without also considering the role of the judge. 13 I shall emphasize
the case of mass torts.
Mass tort cases usually involve serious public concerns in terms
of safety and the prevention of future injuries from harm. Yet,
many of these cases terminate in some form of secrecy agreement
that reduces protection against future harm to the parties.
The private litigant is not required to take into account public
safety in vindicating his or her rights. Significantly, the plaintiff's
attorney's duty of loyalty requires him or her to put the client's
interests ahead of all others. 4 In traditional theory, the lawyer has
no ethical obligation to consider the interests of third parties.
Likewise, the defendant's attorney, according to the ethical rules,
is to maintain the client's confidences. There is, therefore, an
affirmative duty placed upon both parties not to reveal information.
Some plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys contend that it is
almost impossible to settle some cases without a secrecy agree-
ment. This has been my own experience.
Secrecy often has been, in fact, the price of settlement. It is not
unheard of for a defendant to "sweeten" the settlement offer to
plaintiffs on condition of secrecy. The defendant may threaten the
plaintiff with a lengthy and expensive trial to coerce confidentiality.
Some court cases can be brought and settled without the filing of
12 See John R. Wilke & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Settlement Efforts
Collapse, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A3.
13 See WEINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 66-74. Much of the rest of this material
is covered in Jack B. Weinstein's Individual Justice, and, therefore, further
references are omitted.
14 Should there not be a duty of private attorneys to reveal dangers to
responsible government officials? It was reported that attorneys for plaintiffs
injured as a result of tire failures kept this information from the government
because they feared a government investigation might adversely affect their
cases; lives were placed at risk by the government's failure to act. See Keith
Bradsher, Documents Portray Tire Debacle as a Story of Best Opportunities,
N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 11, 2000, at Al; cf John C. P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Fipursky, The Third Restatement and the Place of Duty in Negligence, 54 VAND.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (discussing duty to protect plaintiff at the hands of
another).
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a single revelatory document. Others are settled on just the threat
of legal action with no public record. Since the ethical rules require
that attorneys obtain a swift and optimal recovery for their clients,
the plaintiff's attorney seems to have little choice but to accept a
favorable settlement offer on secrecy terms.
Three categories of secrecy should be considered separately: (1)
secrecy as to documents that appear to reveal a defendant's
negligent or otherwise wrongful conduct, such as an engineer's
report during the early development of a product indicating
incipient dangers; (2) secrecy as to the amount of a settlement or
terms of payment; and (3) secrecy as to conversations among
attorneys on either plaintiff's or defendant's side, or between
plaintiff and defense counsel.
The most common form of secrecy utilized by the defendant in
a mass tort case is embodied in a protective order. Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26(c) permits a party to seek a protective order
prohibiting dissemination of information produced in discovery
upon a showing of "good cause." 5 This provision does not
specifically refer to the public interest. Rather, it applies primarily
to commercially sensitive information that might cause the
defendant some competitive harm. Defendants want to avoid
disclosure of damaging information. Plaintiffs desire to use this
damaging information as a negotiation tool for larger settlements
for clients in the future.
"Smoking gun" documents are the most damaging form of this
information. They indicate that defendants knew of the danger but
suppressed the information. Oral testimony obtained in depositions
is also often highly useful to plaintiffs and devastating to defen-
dants. Documents showing cover-ups or early knowledge of defects
by defendants can lead to punitive damages as well as to extensive
liability for ordinary damages, so there is strong reason for
defendants to try to keep them secret. Threats by plaintiffs'
15 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). In pertinent part, Rule 26(c) provides: "Upon
motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought, . . . and for
good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending ... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance,
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense." Id.
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attorneys to reveal them can be a powerful lever for higher
settlements.
The societal interest in knowing what went wrong and why is
great. Yet, there is some basis for the points made by defendants'
counsel. First, the cost and time to explain a single document taken
out of context by a plaintiff's lawyer creates an incentive not to
prepare memoranda. Second, what appears damning may, in
context after difficult proof, be shown to be neutral or even
favorable to the defendant.
Courts have broad discretion in entering protective orders and
sealing records. Most agreements are uncontested, and crowded
calendars put great pressure on judges to move cases. As a result,
judges routinely approve sealing and secrecy orders. Settlement
agreements are often filed under seal as a matter of course.
It has been my practice to append a note to my approvals of a
sealing order that "this order is subject to modification by the court
in the public interest." In the Agent Orange case, I set aside one of
these orders after settlement because the public and veterans were
entitled to know the facts.16 If the court is faced with the question
of whether to seal documents, it should engage in a balancing test,
weighing the interests of the parties in keeping the information
confidential against the interests of the public in publishing it.
Judges should also consider the interests of litigants in other suits,
the needs of regulatory agencies to have access to information,
concerns of public interest groups, and the interests of future
plaintiffs.
In cases dealing with sociopolitical problems, the court must
look to the effect on the community. The individual litigant's needs
cannot be the court's sole concern. The mass tort case and many
other cases are similar to an institutional reform case in their
impact. The public, which created and funds our judicial institu-
tions, depends upon those institutions to protect it. Sometimes the
needs of individual members of the community in a litigation must
yield to those of the community as a whole.
16 In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Governmental regulatory systems designed to protect the public
are often inadequate to their task. Mechanisms such as the
Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA"), the
Consumer Product Safety Commission ("CPSC"), the Food and
Drug Administration ("FDA"), and the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") have not yet fulfilled their promise, leaving
society insufficiently protected.
Although the Consumer Product Safety Act ("CPSA")"7
requires manufacturers to report defects that have or may cause
serious injury or death, substantial underreporting appears to be the
rule.'8 Just a few hundred product hazard reports from nearly two
million businesses engaged in manufacturing, distributing, or
selling consumer products are said to be received annually. There
is a great disincentive to report. A firm's own report may serve as
damaging documentary evidence in a product liability lawsuit.
In 1990, reporting requirements were strengthened to require
companies to report any product that was the subject of three
product liability lawsuits in a three-year period.' 9 Portions of these
lawsuit reports, however, remain confidential and are not subject
to private discovery.
The recent revelations about the possibly serious side effects
associated with silicone gel breast implants demonstrate the FDA's
problems. 20 Even though the agency had years to investigate, it
has been charged that it left an estimated one million women with
implants "in emotional and medical limbo." Benign neglect by
agencies set up to protect the public is one of the reasons for our
reliance on the tort system for protection.
17 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2073 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
18 See generally Michael R. Lemov & Malcom D. Woolf, Underreporting
Defects Is Risky, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1992, at S6. Section 15(b) of the CPSA
mandates that manufacturers report all incidents where information is obtained
that "reasonably supports the conclusion" that a particular product may "create
a substantial product hazard" or alternatively manifest "an unreasonable risk of
serious injury or death." 15 U.S.C. § 2064(b) (1994).
19 15 U.S.C. § 2084(a), (b) (1994).
20 See generally In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F. Supp. 958 (E.D.N.Y. &
S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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Should we be satisfied with a system that required officers of
the court to remain silent for years while more and more women
suffered from what they think was harm caused by breast implants?
If this silence is "a price we must pay," what do we receive in
return?
Currently a national campaign is under way, in the name of
public safety, to create a presumption of public access to all
information produced in litigation. Advocates claim that protective
orders are being used to hide product defects and public hazards
and have been pressing for legislation to restrict the court's
discretion to issue protective and sealing orders. These plaintiffs'
attorneys have a selfish interest in opening the files for other
litigations. Yet, much can be said in favor of the public's right to
know.
Arguably, even out-of-court procedures such as arbitration
affect the public interest. A federal statute supports our national
arbitration scheme.2' Should attorneys have any ethical obligation
to inform the public, or at least the appropriate government body,
of dangers revealed in private arbitrations? I think so, under
adequate judicial control.
A number of states have enacted sweeping reforms to restrict
the courts' ability to seal documents. This sunshine approach is
not without its critics. One defense attorney who testified before a
California legislative committee investigating protective orders and
the public safety asserted that troops in the Persian Gulf War were
fighting to prevent the type of privacy invasion that such rules
would effect. Another likened forcing defense attorneys to consider
the public interest in disclosure of potential dangers to asking a
criminal defense attorney who knows his client is guilty to turn the
client over to the authorities.
The knowledge that secrecy cannot be depended on may
discourage engineers and others from expressing doubts about a
policy in written reports. There is thus a possibility that less
secrecy may increase dangers to society. Even some plaintiffs'
21 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
22 E.g., Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West
2000).
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attorneys admit that rules limiting protective orders make them
nervous because they "inject a wild card into the settlement game."
Protective orders do have a legitimate role when there is no
public impact or when true trade secrets are involved. We can
strike a fair balance between the privacy interests of a corporation
and the health and safety of the public so long as we recognize that
a publicly maintained legal system ought not protect those who
engage in misconduct, conceal the cause of injury from the victims,
or render potential victims vulnerable. Secrecy in such instances
defeats a function of the justice system - to reveal important legal
factual issues to the public. The balance must involve the exercise
of some judicial discretion. Yet, even judges have a conflict.
Judges will tend to approve a secrecy agreement that encourages
settlement and clearing of dockets. One law professor suggested
that a remedy might be for the court to employ an ombudsman to
weigh the secrecy issue independently of the trial judge. In the
federal courts a magistrate judge might do the job, although this
official too would want to see the court's calendar reduced.
Whatever the method chosen, it should be a national approach
whenever cases are consolidated on a national basis. It is not
possible to control the litigation effectively if each state's privileges
and secrecy laws are applied. Such laws should, for purpose of
mass torts, be deemed procedural so that, under Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, a federal court does not have to apply the laws of fifty
states.23
The amount of settlement in any particular case is normally a
matter of much less public interest than is evidence of the merits.
Sometimes a defendant will give a premium to a particularly
effective advocate or appealing case because going to trial might
result in an unusually high verdict, ratcheting up settlements across
the board. At other times the defendant will agree to a settlement
in a completely meritless case because the jurisdiction is notorious-
ly pro-plaintiff and resistance is hopeless. But the defendant may
not wish to provide a basis for national settlements before more
neutral judges and juries. One leading defense attorney complained
to me, "plaintiffs' attorneys have misled the public into believing
23 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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that the settlement amount is linked to the worth of the case." But
what a willing buyer and seller agree upon is value, and a
statistical analysis of jury verdicts and settlements is used in all
mature litigations to set values. Here, again, some discretion by the
court is called for.
These considerations appear to me to be reasonable. I see no
strong reason to oppose some form of secrecy as to settlement
amount. Neither plaintiff nor defense counsel seem to object, and
no great public interest is implicated. In publicly held corporations,
Securities and Exchange Commission filings may, in any event,
reveal such litigation details.
There may, however, be occasion when only one plaintiff's
attorney is aware of a problem that, if known, could result in a
huge influx of cases. A secret settlement conceivably could result
in great injustice to many people. This situation is highly unlikely
in view of the vigilance of the press and the bar. But should it
exist, the court would, I believe, be justified in refusing to suppress
the fact, if not the amount, of the settlement.
Of course, the parties could forestall judicial intervention by
settling before the suit is started. To start the suit, settle secretly,
and then withdraw without informing the court of the fact that a
settlement occurred seems to me to be an unethical act by attorneys
for both sides. Having taken advantage of the court system paid for
by the public, the attorneys should have an obligation of candor to
the court and, if the court so orders, to the public.
When a comprehensive opinion is destroyed, suppressed, or
withdrawn as part of a settlement, so, too, are the answers to
complex questions such as "the interpretation and validity of a
statute, the interpretation of contract clauses regarding insurance
coverage of pollution clean-up costs, and the effects of hazardous
substances upon individuals and the environment., 24 According to
Professor Jill Fisch, "[t]he time and effort invested in resolving
these issues is a public resource," which inures to the benefit of
future claimants as well.25
24 Jill E. Fisch, Captive Courts: The Destruction of Judicial Decision by
Agreement of the Parties, 2 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 191, 203 (1993).
2 Id. at 204.
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Professor Fisch has a point. Unless an error has been demon-
strated, once an opinion is issued there is strong reason not to
withdraw it because it can assist other courts and parties in their
analysis. Nevertheless, there may be rare situations where with-
drawal will sufficiently defuse a situation so that a settlement
beneficial to the public or the parties will result. Hard-and-fast
rules in this area may be dangerous. In one case, I withdrew an
opinion in a minor franchising case to save the parties much
expense; one of the parties was a poor small store owner. If the
opinion had been published, the defendant would have been
litigated to the death.
Ethical dilemmas regarding secrecy go well beyond the scope
of protective orders and secret settlements. Suppose a defendant
conditions a more generous settlement on the plaintiffs' attorney,
experienced in a particular litigation, not taking any more cases
against that defendant. The attorney may be asked to give up
copies of documents and depositions. He or she may be hired as a
consultant to the defendant.
There is an ethical obligation to maximize the client's benefit.
There is also an ethical rule that one may not restrict an attorney's
right to practice. What is the lawyer's obligation to a client who
does not yet exist and whom he or she may never represent? Does
a lawyer have a duty to future clients by virtue of having once
offered his or her services? Or what happens if a defendant offers
a larger settlement on the condition that the attorney say nothing
publicly about the case? Is it unethical to give up the right to
discuss the case or to inform the public? Does the attorney's duty
to the individual client always prevail? The American Bar Asso-
ciation issued Ethics Formal Opinion 93-371 on this subject. The
opinion states:
A restriction on the right of plaintiffs' counsel to represent
present clients and future claimants against a defendant as
part of a global settlement of some of counsel's existing
clients' claims against that same defendant represents an
impermissible restriction on the right to practice which
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may not be demanded or accepted without violating Model
Rule 5.6(b).26
Recognizing that the problem "raises important issues regarding
the intersection between a lawyer's duty to his or her present
clients under Model Rule 1.2 and impermissible restrictions in the
right of a lawyer to practice under Model 5.6," the opinion found
most persuasive the arguments under Rule 5.6.27 "While the
Model Rules generally require that the client's interests be put first,
forcing a lawyer to give up future representations may be asking
too much, particularly in light of the strong countervailing policy
favoring the public's unfettered choice of counsel. 28 If an offer
of this type of conditional settlement is unethical, does the
plaintiffs' lawyer who receives such an offer have a duty to report
the defense lawyer who made the offer?
Corporate "buyouts" of classes of claimants are not new. One
of the earliest reported buyouts resulted from the deaths of more
than seven hundred workers from silicosis caused by the construc-
tion of the Hawk's Nest Tunnel in West Virginia in the early
1930s. 29 Union Carbide Corporation hired black migrant laborers
to work on the project without taking the most minimal safety
precautions. Despite substantial resistance by defendants, eventually
hundreds of suits were filed. In what was then the longest trial in
the country (five weeks), a team of plaintiffs' lawyers presented
one hundred seventy five witnesses. Since the plaintiffs had limited
resources, their attorneys made a considerable investment in the
case, hoping that a favorable verdict would lead to a large number
of settlements. The jury deadlocked.
Shortly before a second case was to come to trial, seventeen
plaintiffs' lawyers entered into an out-of-court settlement on behalf
of one hundred fifty seven claimants. The claimants had asked for
$4 million but were given $130,000, half of which went to the
attorneys. It was later revealed that the plaintiffs' attorneys had
secretly signed a contract with the tunnel contractor that provided
26 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 371 (1993).
27 Id.
28 id.
29 See generally MARTIN CHERNIACK, THE HAWK'S NEST INCIDENT:
AMERICA'S WORST INDUSTRIAL DISASTER (1986).
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the attorneys, not the clients, with an additional $20,000 if they
agreed not to engage in any further legal action. Upon learning of
the agreement, the judge ordered that half that sum go to the
plaintiffs. Nevertheless, the judge upheld a provision that the
plaintiffs' lawyers surrender all case records to the defendants. The
second trial also resulted in a hung jury. Ultimately, a block
settlement was agreed upon, and again, the plaintiffs' lawyers were
required to turn over all legal papers to the defense. They were
obliged to suppress all information relating to the case. These same
tactics were used in an early asbestos case against Johns-Manville
and in the settlement of the Buffalo Creek Disaster.3°
These "buyouts" need to be supervised by the court in the same
way as a settlement of a class action would be. The court has an
obligation to the clients and to the community to see that the
clients understand the arrangement and that it is fair. The court
should also be able to veto any arrangement for secrecy under
which files are returned to defendants, and plaintiffs' lawyers agree
to take no future cases. The Hawk's Nest case was a shameful
episode in American jurisprudence; without the judge's intervention
it would have been even worse.
I conclude where I began. Each case is different, but, in
general, where there is a doubt, secrecy should be rejected. Any
secrecy agreement should have a judicial imprimatur, with the
discretion in the court to modify the agreement on application of
a party to the litigation or of a third party.
'o See generally GERALD M. STERN, THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER (1976).

SECRECY IN CIVIL LITIGATION:
DISCOVERY AND PARTY AGREEMENTS
Jack H. Friedenthal*
Controversies regarding the extent to which the courts should
prohibit free public access to information developed in civil cases
are not new. In addition to a number of cases,' a series of signifi-
cant articles have discussed various aspects of the matter2 and
* Freda H. Alverson Professor of Law, The George Washington University
Law School. B.A. Stanford University; J.D. Harvard Law School.
' See, e.g., Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 610-11
(1978) (finding that the court was not required to allow a television network to
make copies of tape recordings that had been played in criminal trial); Proctor
& Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996) (ruling
that the court could not grant temporary restraining order against magazine's
planned publication of litigation documents it had obtained but had been placed
under seal); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 785-91 (3d Cir.
1994) (stating that a settlement agreement is not a "judicial record" and is
therefore not subject to the right-of-access doctrine); Wolhar v. General Motors
Corp., 712 A.2d 464, 469-70 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (ruling that a court may
modify an existing protective order of confidentiality to allow parties seeking
intervention access to potentially discoverable material).
2 See, e.g., Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of
Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 283-
88 (discussing both sides of the current debate about consensual confidentiality
in light of civil litigation's shifted focus from public trial to private pre-trial
adjudication and canvassing various proposals limiting the discretion of judges
and parties to enter into secrecy agreements); David Luban, Settlements and the
Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619, 2648-59 (1995) (examining the
tension between the purpose of the judicial process to serve the "public good"
and need for judicial economy provided by encouraging settlement and for
recognition of parties' privacy rights); Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REv. 457, 459-68 (1991)
(chronicling the evolution of the confidentiality debate and examining various
proposals granting public access to discovery materials); Carrie Menkel-Meadow,
Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democratic Defense of
Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2682-87 (1995) (examining the
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provided reasons both for and against the powers and duties of
judges to maintain confidentiality, particularly in situations where
the parties themselves agree that information should not be
disclosed. One recent article 3 provides an excellent summary of the
various views that have been advanced. Several states have adopted
legislation limiting the enforcement of confidentiality agreements,4
and the matter has arisen in other states5 as well as before Congress.6
perils and necessity of private settlements and giving examples of cases when
publicity may be appropriate); Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective
Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L.REv. 427, 429-32 (1991)
(comparing value of confidentiality with harmful consequences of a presumption
of public access and evaluating benefits of restricting protective orders); Richard
A. Zitrin, The Case Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can
Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY LEGAL ETHICS 115, 115-17 (1999) (setting
forth a proposal to amend American Bar Association Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.2 to preclude attorneys from entering into agreements restricting
public's access to information lawyers reasonably believe directly concerns
substantial danger to public health or safety); Richard A. Rosen, Confidentiality
Agreements Become Increasingly Elusive: Several States Have Limited the
Availability of Protective Orders, and Judges Are Now More Skeptical About
Issuing Such Orders, NAT'L L.J., July 20, 1998, at B7 (examining reasons for the
erosion of broadly framed protective orders). The author of this article relies
heavily on these authorities.
3 Dore, supra note 2.
' E.g., Florida Sunshine in Litigation Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West
2000); TEX. R. Crv. P. 76a.
' Rosen, supra note 2, at B7 n.5 (listing states that have adopted such
legislation).
6 See Sunshine in Litigation Act of 1999, S.957, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999). This piece of legislation has been proposed by Senator Kohl of
Wisconsin. Members of Congress have proposed similar bills in the past. See
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Court and Administrative Practice of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on S. 1404, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 20, 1994)
[hereinafter Hearings]. It is interesting to note that many years ago, in 1913,
Congress enacted the Publicity in Taking Evidence Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. § 30
(1994), which permits public access to depositions taken in civil antitrust actions
brought by the government seeking injunctive relief. Recently the Act was
applied to permit the New York Times and other news organizations to sit in on
depositions in United States v. Microsoft Corp., 165 F.3d 952, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1999), subject to protective orders issued for good cause to prevent public
disclosure of trade secrets and other material that the court finds should remain
confidential. The case is discussed in the forthcoming edition of the George
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The arguments on both sides are on two quite different levels,
one involving philosophical concepts of the role of the courts in
society and the other concerning the practical effects of disclosure
or non-disclosure on parties to disputes and to the public at large.
Usually, these considerations are intertwined. Yet it seems useful
at the outset of an analysis to treat them separately because one's
ultimate view as to whether broad protection against disclosure is
or is not appropriate is rooted in one's belief as to the fundamental
nature and purposes of a court system regarding civil disputes.
I. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
A. The Basic Conflict
Our civil judicial system, in its fundamental concept, exists as
an avenue by which one citizen can seek redress from another in
an orderly fashion, under a set of logical rules. It is, of course, but
one avenue. No one has to file a lawsuit. Parties to contracts can,
and often do, agree in advance to other techniques of dispute
resolution. And even in the absence of such a provision, or in non-
contract cases, litigation in court is hardly the only method of
solving problems. There has been an explosion of alternate dispute
resolution opportunities and techniques in the recent past,7 in part
reflecting negatively on the efficacy of litigation in the courts.
Courts do not reach out for disputes. They must be brought to
the court by one of the parties. Moreover, the mere filing of a case
by itself is of little consequence. Indeed, that may be true of much
of the pre-trial process. The court plays no role in the process
unless and until a matter is brought before it for its attention.
Furthermore, even when a case is before the court, alternative
dispute resolution techniques are available. Indeed, they are
extolled and supported, and sometimes required, by the courts
themselves.8
Washington Law Review.
7 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 2664-65 (noting that "settlement has
become the 'norm' for our system").
8 See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(5), 16(c)(9), 26(f).
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Analytically then, it could be said that the courts exist solely to
provide a service to the citizens who need a forum. Courts react to
the requests of those who come before them. They have no role
other than to provide the service for which they are created, the
resolution of disputes of those individuals who are involved in a
particular case. If those parties determine that information concern-
ing their dispute should be kept private and confidential, then the
court has no business in interfering.
On the other hand, it can be argued that courts are much more
than a service establishment for settling problems of individuals
who come before them. Courts are paid for by the citizens of the
jurisdiction in which they sit. They exist by virtue of the constitu-
tion and laws of those jurisdictions. They are part of the govern-
mental structure and operations, as much as the executive or the
legislature. The citizens who pay for the courts are entitled to know
what they do and why they do it. Those who enter the court
system, voluntarily or by process, are simply not entitled to any
rights of privacy and confidentiality. When it comes to judicial
decisions, both the procedural and substantive legal rules by which
the courts decide cases, in effect, belong to the citizens at large.9
Citizens need to know those rules to determine if they are improp-
er. If they are, then the citizens can seek legislation to alter them.
If a judge ignores or misconstrues existing rules, or otherwise
exhibits poor judgment, he or she can be exposed and, in those
jurisdictions in which judges must stand for election, can be voted
out of office. Under the latter concept, then, it would be fair to say
that the courts are government instrumentalities that must operate
in the interest of the populous, and every aspect of that operation
must be open to public scrutiny.
The above positions are, of course, extremes, and most
commentators agree that a balance must be struck to decide when
matters are to be kept confidential and when they are to be
9 See Luban, supra note 2, at 2633-40. "[Flor the public-life conception [of
the judicial process] all adjudications are public in significance - they are
political, inevitably embroiling the meaning and legitimacy of government."
Luban, supra note 2, at 2635.
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available to the public.1" That does not mean, however, that it has
been easy to decide where the line is to be drawn and how it is to
be administered." A number of cases tend to leave matters open
to public scrutiny, based on a presumption that unless a court, for
good cause, issues a protective order, the fruits of discovery belong
to the public. 12 As noted at the outset, those who debate the
matter interweave arguments based on practical considerations with
their underlying theoretical positions. The view that courts and their
operations belong to the public is bolstered by those who challenge
or downplay the value of alternate dispute resolution and settle-
ment, 3 situations in which confidentiality is more easily main-
tained and justified than in the case of a trial where arguments
favoring public access to evidence are much more difficult to
refute. 14
0 See Marcus, supra note 2, at 467 (observing that "proper resolution of
these competing positions is a middle course based on established protective
order principles properly applied to the concerns voiced by those who cite the
supposed dangers to public health resulting from discovery confidentiality");
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 2684-85 (arguing that altogether eliminating
private dispute resolution is undesirable); Miller, supra note 2, at 478-79
(eviscerating such orders' availability altogether is not the best method to solve
the problem that protective orders concealing information important to public
health).
i Rules and statutes that attempt to set the line vary. See infra Part II.B.
12 See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187
F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 98
F.R.D. 539 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 821 F.2d 139, 145-46 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied sub nom. Dow Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) [hereinafter
Agent Orange].
3See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085
(1984) (arguing that substituting alternative dispute resolution for a lawsuit
"trivializ[es] the remedial dimensions of a lawsuit" and "reduc[es] the social
function of the lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes"); Luban, supra note
2, at 2640 (opining that benefits of settlement render "a world without settlement
... unthinkable"). See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases
Settle": Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1339 (1994) (encouraging courts and policymakers to approach settlement with
a critical eye due to the disparate nature of adjudication and settlement).
14 See Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 680 (3d Cir. 1988) (determin-
ing that a protective order of confidentiality does not apply to document
subsequently entered into evidence); Agent Orange, 98 F.R.D. 539, 544-45
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Putting aside practical considerations regarding the competing
needs for confidentiality and public awareness, there are strong
reasons for viewing the formal judicial system as a method for
public awareness. There are also strong reasons for viewing the
formal judicial system as a method for private adjudication and
those who are involved in private civil litigation should not, by that
alone, lose any rights to privacy and confidentiality. Except in
special circumstances involving "public cases,"' 5 the basic assump-
tion should support litigants who agree among themselves that
discovery and other information should be protected. Courts in civil
cases are not an arm of the executive branch. They are neither
investigators nor attorneys general. They do not control disputes
that are never filed in court. They cannot reach out to bring matters
into their ambit, no matter how much they might believe that the
public should know about them. Even when suits are filed, judges
do not become involved unless and until they are asked to do so.
They are not empowered to restyle complaints or answers to fit
their notions of "public justice" or what could become an interes-
ting dispute or "cannon fodder" for eager news reporters. More
activist judges may make suggestions, but they do not command
that lawyers conduct discovery according to what matters the
judges believe should or should not be pursued. They do not go
behind admissions of fact or application of law to fact, such as
those made pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36, even
though an admission may operate as a partial settlement and cover
up underlying facts. Indeed Rule 36 specifically encourages its use,
and the privacy it entails, by prohibiting use of admissions in
subsequent cases. 16
We could, at least theoretically, establish an inquisitorial-type
system in which the judges with ample staffs take a major role in
(E.D.N.Y. 1983) (reasoning that the public release of documents submitted to the
court in connection with a summary judgment motion, unlike documents obtained
via discovery and not submitted to the court, would not prejudice defendants).
'" See infra Part I.B.
16 FED R. CIV. P. 36(b) (providing that "[a]ny admission made by a party
under this rule is for the purpose of the pending action only and is not an
admission for any other purpose nor may it be used against the party in any other
proceeding").
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the initiation and investigation of potential private civil actions as
well as in their determination. Suffice it to say this approach places
more power in the hands of judges, and hence the government, than
many of us are ready to accept. Indeed, they would no longer be
"judges" as we now know them. Our reluctance to cede so much
control to the judicial branch of government is underscored by the
fact that we tend to maintain the right to jury trial in many of our
civil cases.
17
B. The Special Nature of Public Civil Cases
It is important to distinguish between private and public cases.
Private cases are brought to determine issues among parties who
are not governmental entities. Cases by or against the government
or an agency of government stand in a different light. People are
entitled to know the actions of their public servants in order to
assess both competency and fairness. Courts have recognized the
need for disclosure in such cases. 8 On occasion, legislation has
dealt specifically with the issue.19 Even then, we must be aware
" It seems fair to say that the United States Supreme Court beginning with
Beacon Theatres, Inc. v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959), going through Ross v.
Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970), and continuing with Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), tended to expand the right to jury trial through
its interpretations of the Seventh Amendment. The effect of this tendency may
be countered to some extent by the Court's decisions that encourage the use of
summary judgment. See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242
(1986).
"S See, e.g., Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 791 (3d Cir.
1994) (holding that "where it is likely that information is accessible under a
relevant freedom of information law, a strong presumption exists against granting
or maintaining" a confidentiality order); Mullins v. City of Griffin, 886 F. Supp.
21, 22-23 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (holding that a municipality is not entitled to a protec-
tive order of confidentiality of settlement in a civil rights lawsuit filed against it).
'9 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(8)(a) (West 2000) (providing for disclosure
in cases brought against a governmental entity). It is not clear why the Florida
statute does not include cases brought by the government. See also The Publicity
in Taking Evidence Act of 1913, 15 U.S.C. § 30 (1994) (opening depositions to
the public in civil antitrust suits brought by the United States).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
that a need for confidentiality may exist for involved citizens. 20
It is with respect to the activities of the government itself, or its
agents acting within the scope of their duties, that the balance tips
sharply in favor of full and complete disclosure.
That, in turn, leads to the interesting question of whether, by
making a decision in a case, or conducting a trial, the trial judge
converts a case from private to public. If we have a right, and an
obligation, to scrutinize the actions of our public officials,
shouldn't a judge's decisions and the conduct of a public trial
outweigh the parties' rights to privacy and confidentiality? The
situation is different from one in which the parties act on their own
with respect to the gathering of information, agreeing on various
issues, and determining how to proceed. There seems little
theoretical justification in the latter case for failing to honor the
parties' confidentiality agreements merely on the basis that an
action was filed.
When, however, the court is called upon to decide matters in
dispute, the decisions themselves, with few exceptions, should be
open to the public, although they may be written carefully so as not
to reveal private information considered by the court when making
its determinations. And barring extenuating circumstances, evidence
presented on the record at a trial should be made available to
anyone who wishes to review it.2' With regard to preliminary
matters, however, the situation is not so clear. Obviously if a court,
on motion, issues an order supporting a confidentiality agreement
among the parties, then the documents provided to the judge,
revealing the confidential information for which protection is
20 Classic examples are lurid cases that involve children as victims or
witnesses.
2 See Littlejohn v. BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 678 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding
that despite the strong presumption that public access should be given to judicial
record, a court may deny access to certain information, such as sources of
business information, that might harm a litigant's competitive standing); see also
Dore, supra note 2, at 378-83 (asserting that testimony or documents introduced
at trial or forming the basis of summary judgment or other merits determination
carry an exceptionally strong presumption of public access overcome only by the
most compelling of competing considerations, while procedural matters unrelated
or only tangentially related to a decision on the merits should carry a much lower
and more readily rebuttable presumption of public access).
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sought, cannot be open to the public. But what if the requested
protective order is coupled with a motion for summary judgment
and seeks to keep under seal the very documents upon which the
grant or denial of summary judgment depends? In such a case the
nature of the matter at issue and the ruling itself may be determina-
tive. If summary judgment is granted so that the case is thereby
curtailed or ended, the justification for open files is strong and only
a significant showing of a justification for privacy should limit
disclosure.22 If relief is denied, however, and no specific issue is
finally determined 23 so that the case continues unabated, the
matter is more difficult. The issues involved in the summary
judgment decision will remain open at trial. In the meantime,
however, the case may settle or further development of the case
may render the earlier issues moot. Although the summary
judgment decision itself will be available, if the parties agree that
the supporting documents should not be disclosed, they should be
protected absent a sound reason for their disclosure.24
C. Class Actions and Other Representative Actions
Class actions, and others in which persons outside the court
may be bound by in-court representatives, also require special
consideration whenever the actions in the case might reasonably
justify interference by those who are represented. Federal Rule
23(d)(2) specifically provides that a court may require, in order to
protect the members of a class, that the class receive notice of any
step in the action so that they might appear to intervene.25 Under
Federal Rule 23(e), class members must be notified of any
proposed dismissal or compromise.26 Obviously an unnamed class
member cannot make a seasoned decision as to what steps he or
22 See Agent Orange, 98 F.R.D. at 544-45.
23 Even a denial may involve a specific determination by the court of an
issue. This would occur, for example, if a motion for summary judgment is based
on an alleged defense, and the court holds that the defense does not apply.
24 But see Dore, supra note 2, at 380 (arguing that there should be a strong
presumption of access in such cases).
25 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d)(2).
26 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
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she might take in a situation if key information is held in secret. In
such situations, a heavy burden must be placed on those who
would limit access; and even if that burden is met, ways must be
found to prevent injustice. If the persons represented are identified
and their addresses are known, then disclosure can be limited to
them alone; but in many class actions that is not the case, and the
only possibility of reaching many of the unnamed members is by
widely disseminated media advertisements.27
II. PRACTICAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
CONFIDENTIALITY
Decisions as to confidentiality ought not to be made on abstract
theories as to the proper role of the courts in society. On a day-to-
day basis courts make decisions that affect citizens, parties and
nonparties, in ways that directly involve their lives. Litigants want,
and deserve, a system that works, one that operates fairly and
efficiently to resolve their disputes whether on their own or by
court action.
Protection from disclosure can be sought at different times and
in different ways. First, at any stage in the proceeding, parties can
enter into a private agreement to ensure confidentiality. If a breach
occurs, an aggrieved party can bring a separate action for damag-
es.28 Second, at the time discovery is sought, a party, acting
unilaterally, may seek a protective order to limit the inquiry or to
keep the results confidential. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c), 29 which has been adopted in many states, 30 is the basis for
such an order. The rule requires the moving party to show good
cause why an order should be granted. Third, a party may unilater-
ally move for a protective order regarding materials already
obtained through discovery or presented to the court in support of
27 JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.6 (3d ed. 1999).
For large classes, notice by publication may be employed for those members who
cannot be identified by reasonable effort. Id.
28 See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1994).
29 FED R. Civ. P. 26(c).
30 Many state-court provisions are copied largely from Federal Rule 26(c).
See, e.g., COLO. R. CIV. P. 26(c); ILL. SUP. CT. R. 201(c); IOWA R. CIV. P. 123.
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a motion or at trial. Fourth, the parties may, at any stage, agree on
a protective provision for which they seek court approval. Often,
such a confidentiality provision is part of a settlement of the case.
If the protective order is sought after the material has been
presented to the court, it may take the form of a request to seal the
records. The advantage of a protective order lies in the fact that its
enforcement does not require a separate lawsuit. The court that
issued the order may enforce it directly.
A. The Effect of Existing Rules of Procedure
What is interesting is the fact that courts have relied upon the
good-cause requirement of Federal Rule 26(c) and its state
counterparts in deciding the validity of protective orders generally.
Rather than confine the rule to unilateral requests to limit discov-
ery, to which it is directed, a number of courts have treated the rule
as controlling in all situations when a protective order is sought. 3,
A careful reading of Rule 26(c) shows that such a position is
incorrect. The rule provides as follows:
Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom
discovery is sought, accompanied by a certificate that
movant in good faith has conferred or attempted to confer
with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the
dispute without court action, and for good cause shown,
31 See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187
F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding that the district court erred in not using good-
cause criterion in denying motion to intervene); Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Elec.
Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1994) (deciding that an agreement by
parties to seek protective order of confidentiality does not eliminate the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure's good-cause requirement); Glickstein v. Neshaminy
Sch. Dist., No. 96-6236, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2021 *5 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25,
1998) ("In this circuit, the good cause requirement is no mere formality."). The
distinction has not gone unnoticed, however. In Agent Orange, 821 F.2d 139, 145
(2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Dow Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953
(1987), the court, in upholding a lower court decision to alter a previously
imposed protective order under Rule 26(c) to permit public access, relied in part
on the fact that the parties had not entered into a confidentiality agreement as
claimed. The only agreement was to return the documents to the respective
parties who had produced them once the case was over. Id.
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the court... may make any order which justice requires
to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrass-
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.3"
It is quite obvious that the rule has the limited purpose of provid-
ing for protection at the time discovery "is sought." Moreover, it
certainly does not contemplate control of protective orders agreed
upon by the parties, alone or as part of a settlement of the case,
since it applies only if those persons involved have not been able
to "resolve ... [a] dispute without court action., 33
This does not mean, of course, that courts should not develop
standards34 for determining when the court should issue a protec-
tive order based on a private agreement of confidentiality or when
such an agreement should be enforced in a separate action. It does
mean that courts should not consider themselves bound by Federal
Rule 26(c) in such situations, and, to that extent, should be free to
accept party agreements as prima facie valid and to challenge them
only if and when contrary considerations are presented.
A few courts have also discussed Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 5(d)3 5 as a basis for the required disclosure of the fruits
of discovery.36 That provision currently 37 reads as follows:
All papers after the complaint required to be served upon
a party, together with a certificate of service, shall be filed
32 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
33 Id.
" See Pansy, 23 F.3d at 786 (requiring district court to balance competing
public and privacy interests and show "good cause" under Rule 26 existed before
entering order of confidentiality).
35 FED. R. Crv. P. 5(d).
36 See, e.g., Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 779-81 (1st
Cir. 1988) (holding that Rule 5(d) "creates a presumption that all discovery
materials will be available to the public because they will be filed in court");
Agent Orange, 821 F.2d 139, 146-47 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied sub nom. Dow
Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 484 U.S. 953 (1987) (finding that Rule 5(d) embodies the
legislative intent that class action litigants and the public should be afforded
access to discovery materials whenever possible).
3' An alteration of Rule 5(d) that would normally prohibit the filing of
discovery material until used in court has been approved by the Supreme Court
and, unless altered by Congress, will become effective on December 1, 2000.
FED. R. CIrv. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
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with the court within a reasonable time after service but
the court may on motion of a party or on its own initiative
order that depositions upon oral examination and interroga-
tories, requests for documents, requests for admission, and
answers and responses thereto not be filed unless on order
of the court or for use in the proceeding.3 8
The limitation with respect to discovery was not included in the
provision as originally promulgated, but was added by amendment
in 1980 to benefit courts that were inundated with materials in
ongoing cases. An initial proposal to eliminate the need to file
discovery unless ordered by the court or until the material was used
was rejected on the ground that "such materials are sometimes of
interest to those who may have no access to them except by a
requirement of filing, such as members of a class, litigants
similarly situated, or the public generally."3 9 Thus, it is argued
with some force that Rule 5(d) was designed in part to provide
open access to the fruits of discovery.4"
There are several reasons, however, why Rule 5(d) has, at best,
limited value as a basis for upsetting an agreement among parties
that their discovery be kept confidential. First, by its terms Rule
5(d) does not apply to documents or other real items4" obtained
in accordance with Federal Rule 34, the rule that governs discovery
of such items. Rule 5(d) applies only to papers "required to be
served on a party." Federal Rule 34 only requires that the request
for documents and an answer to the request be "served." The latter
answer is simply an agreement to the request or an objection to it.
38 FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d).
'9 FED. R. CIV. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
40 See Agent Orange, 821 F.2d 139, 146 (2d Cir. 1987).
41 In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 191 n.29 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (ruling that
"responses to requests for documents under Rule 34 do not become part of the
public record unless one of the parties seeks to introduce them into evidence or
to rely on them in a pleading"); Mirak v. McGhan Med. Corp., 141 F.R.D. 34,
39 (D. Mass. 1992) (holding that Rule 5(d) applies "only to pleadings required
to be served upon a party"). The court in Agent Orange recognized the limitation
but held that documents could be obtained under a district court order in light of
its "broad supervisory authority in class actions." Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at
147.
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The items produced are not "served. 42 Since documents are at the
heart of many claims for access by outsiders,43 the efficacy of
Rule 5(d) is limited.44
Second, pursuant to the 1980 amendment to Rule 5(d), a
number of courts have promulgated local rules barring or excusing
parties from filing discovery materials unless ordered to do so.45
As a result, discovery materials in many courts are not covered by
the rule. More significant is the fact that a proposed amendment to
Rule 5(d), approved by the Supreme Court and sent to Congress, 46
would provide a uniform rule for all federal courts that discovery
materials must not be filed until utilized in the proceeding or
ordered to be filed by the court. Unless Congress acts, the
amendment will go into effect on December 1, 2000.47
Third, unlike Rule 26(c), Rule 5(d), as it stands, does not
include a "good cause" standard for determining when a court can
order that the fruits of discovery not be filed. There is nothing in
the rule to prohibit a court from honoring agreements among the
parties that the results of discovery not be disclosed. The bottom
line is that neither Rule 26(c) nor Rule 5(d), themselves, necessari-
ly obviate a presumption favoring confidentiality with regard to
materials not introduced in proceedings before the court.
42 FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b).
41 See, e.g., Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 144; Public Citizen v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 777 (1st Cir. 1988); cf Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20, 25-26 (1984).
4 One court has referred to the matter as a technicality, arguing that it
would make no sense to permit the request and answer to be available but not
the documents themselves. Agent Orange, 821 F.2d at 147. That is not so clear,
however. Unlike other discovery rules, excepting Rule 35 regarding physical
examinations, prior to its amendment in 1970, Rule 34 required a party to obtain
a court order based upon a showing of good cause before it could obtain
production of another's party documents or other items. Thus at the time that
Rule 5(d) was promulgated, there was an important distinction made between
testimonial discovery and discovery of one's property. If a party's access to
documents of an adversary was permitted only on a showing of good cause, it
tends to explain why the rule was written so as not to require the routine filing
of such documents allowing public access.
41 FED. R. Civ. P. 5(d) advisory committee's note.
46 id.
47 Id.
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B. Legislative Solutions, Proposed and Enacted
As noted above, at present the basic rule in most courts
regarding protective orders is quite similar to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(c). 48 Perhaps it is because usually49 there are no
other rules than Rule 26(c), in accordance with a "long established
legal tradition,"5 that have often been expanded to apply the
requirement of "good cause" to virtually all requested protective
orders whether or not as limitations on proposed discovery and
even when based on a stipulation of all parties."
Even so, it is not surprising that many federal courts have
routinely approved and granted enforcement to confidentiality
clauses in settlement agreements without a serious review.52 As
we have seen, Rule 26(c), at least on its face, requires parties to
attempt to enter into confidentiality agreements and does not apply
if they do so successfully. Thus, it appears to embrace the
fundamental notion that a lawsuit is a private matter subject to
48 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
49 An exception is DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 5(g)(2). "Court Records or
portions thereof shall not be placed under seal unless and except to the extent
that the person seeking the sealing thereof shall have first obtained, for good
cause shown, an order of the Court specifying those Court Records, categories
of Court Records, or portions thereof which shall be placed under seal." Id.
(emphasis added).
'o Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir.
1996) (quoting Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. F.T.C., 710 F.2d 1165,
1177 (6th Cir. 1983)).
51 San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187 F.3d 1096,
1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (vacating district court blanket protective order pursuant to
Rule 26(c) because, inter alia, good cause was not considered); Jepson, Inc. v.
Makita Elec. Works, Ltd., 30 F.3d 854, 858-59 (7th Cir. 1994) (reversing on
grounds that the record below revealed "no indication that the Magistrate Judge
made an independent determination that 'good cause' existed before issuing the
[protective order]" stipulated by both parties); Glickstein v. Neshaminy Sch.
Dist., No. 96-6236, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2021, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 1998)
(holding that, in accordance with Rule 26(c), the district court must independent-
ly determine if good cause is established even when all parties support the
protective order).
52 Luban, supra note 2, at 2650 & n.122.
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control by the parties. Moreover, the scope of protection allowed
by the rule is very broad, including "annoyance," "embarrassment"
and "oppression" of a party or other person from whom discovery
is sought. The very fact that a confidentiality agreement has been
entered into can be considered good cause, at least in the absence
of a formal objection. 3 If the parties reach an understanding
among themselves that matters should not be disclosed, it would at
the very least be "annoying" to undercut that understanding.
To alter this approach and take into account more of the public
interest when that is thought to be necessary, a few states, notably
Florida,54 Texas,55 and Washington56 have enacted "sunshine"
laws that curtail the powers of their courts to issue protective
orders in certain situations. The chief focus of each of these
provisions are cases involving public health and safety hazards. The
Florida statute also deals with matters involving suits against the
state or other government entities.57 The Texas statute includes
cases involving the administration of public office or governmental
operations .58
One of the major arguments against confidentiality agreements
involves claims that the public is harmed when health or safety
hazards are not revealed. Interestingly, the cited state statutes differ
significantly as to when discovery cannot receive protection. The
Florida provision simply bars the concealing of a hazard that "has
caused and is likely to cause injury., 59 This appears to require a
finding that such a hazard indeed exists. The Texas rule, on the
other hand, bars protective orders that have "any probably adverse
effect upon the general public health or safety," which would seem
" Except for the parties, rarely will anyone even know about a confidentiali-
ty agreement or a motion for a protective order based upon it.
- FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2000) (prohibiting the concealment of
public hazards).
" TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a (prohibiting the concealment of court orders or
opinions).
56 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.601, 611 (West Supp. 2000) (prohibiting
the concealment of public hazards).
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(8) (West 2000).
18 TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(2)(b).
'9 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(2) (West 2000).
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to require a finding that an adverse effect is likely.6° The Wash-
ington statute goes the furthest, refusing protection for "alleged"
hazards.6 These formulations could not only lead to different
results in similar cases, but also to different consequences for the
courts regarding the burden placed upon them when deciding
whether or not to approve or enforce confidentiality agreements.
A proposed federal statute currently before Congress takes a
somewhat different approach. It reads as follows:
(a)(1) a court shall enter an order under rule 26(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure restricting the disclosure
of information obtained through discovery, an order
approving a settlement agreement that would restrict the
disclosure of such information, or an order restricting
access to court records in a civil case only after making
particularized findings of fact that-
(A) such order would not restrict the disclosure of
information which is relevant to the protection of public
health or safety; or
(B)(i) the public interest in disclosure of potential
health and safety hazards is clearly outweighed by a
specific and substantial interest in maintaining the confi-
dentiality of the information or records in question; and
(ii) the requested protective order is no broader than
necessary to protect the privacy interest asserted.
(2) No order entered in accordance with paragraph (1)
(other than an order approving a settlement agreement)
shall continue in effect after the entry of a final judgment,
unless at or after such entry the court makes a separate
particularized finding of fact that the requirements of
paragraph (1)(A) or (B) have been met.
(b) The party who is the proponent for the entry of an
order, as provided under this section, shall have the burden
in obtaining such an order.
60 TEx. R. Civ. P. 76a(1)(a)(2).
61 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.61 1(1)(b) (West Supp. 2000).
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(c)(1) No court of the United States may approve or
enforce any provision of an agreement between or among
parties to a civil action, or approve or enforce an order
subject to subsection (a)(1), that prohibits or otherwise
restricts a party from disclosing any information relevant
to such civil action to any Federal or State agency with
authority to enforce laws regulating an activity relating to
such information.
(2) Any such information disclosed to a Federal or State
agency shall be confidential to the extent provided by
law.62
This proposal has a number of interesting features. First, it uses
as its vehicle for reform a modification of Rule 26(c), even though
it goes well beyond the scope of that provision and, indeed, beyond
pretrial discovery generally. Second, by referring to information
"relevant" to the protection of the public, it uses a different
formulation than any used by the three state statutes discussed
above: more liberal than those of Florida and Texas, and, depend-
ing upon the interpretation of "relevant," nearly as broad as that of
Washington. Third, it provides the trial judges with considerable
discretion in finding that the reasons for disclosure are outweighed
by the need for confidentiality. Fourth, it gives special status to
orders approving settlement agreements by allowing them to
continue after final judgment without further requirements. Finally,
it gives any party an absolute right to provide federal and state
agencies with information regarding public hazards.
On the whole, the statute, if enacted, would require federal trial
judges to study carefully every situation before issuing a protective
order or approval of a settlement containing a confidentiality
provision. Judges would have to struggle with the question of
whether the information involved would be "relevant" with regard
to a matter of public health or safety. This is especially true if
"relevant" is to be interpreted in the same way as it is interpreted
under Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.63 Rule 401
defines "relevant evidence" as that evidence "having any tendency
62 S. 957, 106th Cong. (1999).
63 FED. R. EVID. 401.
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to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable than it would be without
the evidence."'
Note that under the Federal Rules of Evidence, relevant
evidence may be excluded at trial for a number of reasons,
including waste of time.65 Under the proposed statute, would
"relevant evidence" normally be excluded from approval of a
confidentiality provision, no matter how trivial the information,
absent a strong showing why confidentiality is required?
In the subsequent sections of this article, as we explore the
practical arguments for and against confidentiality provisions, we
will consider the proposed statute and the wisdom of its enactment.
C. Arguments Favoring Disclosure of Discovery Materials
There are three basic arguments in favor of a strong policy of
disclosure of discovery materials developed during the course of an
action. First is the notion, already explored to some extent, that the
public is entitled to know what is occurring in cases filed in its
courts. There is nothing inherently wrong with such a proposition
so long as the information sought bears any relationship to the
public's need to know. But even then it must give way when there
are important factors that justify privacy and confidentiality.
Otherwise, it is nothing but an article of faith that can damage the
innocent and disrupt the sensible process of litigation. Nevertheless,
a number of courts in recent years, in denying protective orders,
have invoked a strong presumption favoring disclosure. Although
members of the news media and other interested parties do not
have a First Amendment right to information developed during the
course of a case,' they have often been entitled to intervene in an
64id.
65 FED. R. EvID. 403. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Id. (emphasis
added).
66 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 36 (1984) (rejecting a First
Amendment challenge to a protective order and emphasizing that the "unique
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action to obtain such information despite the party's desire to
maintain confidentiality,67 and such a right has been specifically
mandated by those statutes that have dealt with the matter.68 Both
cases and statutes have been careful to distinguish information as
to someone's trade secrets or other matters involving a competitive
advantage, holding that such material should not be available
without an overwhelming showing of cause.69
The current trend seems unfortunate. There is no reason
whatsoever for allowing public access to information that is
damaging or embarrassing to a party or a witness merely because
it makes good press copy or will engage the public's interest.7°
The intimidation resulting from the dangers of disclosure can
seriously affect the rights of all parties, not just those of "guilty"
defendants. For example, some potential plaintiffs may even forego
filing an action for fear that private information detrimental to them
or their families might be revealed.71 In the past few years, as
technological advancements have changed our lives, we have
become more aware of the value of personal privacy and have been
increasingly alert to its erosion. We may have to be involved in
internet activities on our computers, just as we may have to be
character of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial
latitude to fashion protective orders").
67 See, e.g., San Jose Mercury News, Inc. v. United States Dist. Ct., 187
F.3d 1096, 1103 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing other cases and issuing a mandamus
under federal common law and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requiring
a blanket protective order amended so as to unseal a report).
68 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081(6) (West 2000) ("Any substantially
affected person, including but not limited to representatives of news media, has
standing to contest an order, judgment, agreement, or contract that violates this
section."); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(2) (West 2000) ("[Mlembers of
the public have a right to information necessary for a lay member of the public
to understand the nature, source, and extent of the risk from alleged hazards to
the public.").
69 Miller, supra note 2, at 473-74. State statutes typically specify the need
to protect such information to the extent possible consistent with the right to
public access. See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.601 (West Supp. 2000).
70 Marcus, supra note 2, at 478-80; Miller, supra note 2, at 464-66.
71 Rhinehart, 467 U.S. at 36 n.22 (noting that, out of concern of undesirable
publicity, prospective litigants may eschew legitimate claims "resulting in
frustration of a right as valuable as speech itself") (citations omitted).
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involved in a lawsuit, but that should not mean that everything
about our lives should be available for public consumption.
Second, it has been argued that keeping some information
confidential, particularly when a case is settled, may result in a
continuing hazard to public health and safety. This would occur,
for example, if a particular product on the market is dangerous but
information as to that fact is kept from the public. On the surface
that is a powerful argument for disclosure whenever there is an
indication that such a hidden problem exists. It explains why
statutes that have been proposed or enacted focus on this issue.72
A number of situations have been advanced as examples of cases
where such product defects have been kept from the public.73
And, of course, because of secrecy agreements in settlement of
products liability cases, we cannot be certain of whether there are
more examples to be found.74
There are a number of reasons why this argument is of far less
consequence than would first appear. To begin with, plaintiffs file
complaints that are open and available to the public as are motions
and other proceedings. Parties are free to talk about the hazards and
to inform the proper authorities before the filing and during the
course of a case before any confidentiality agreement has been
reached. Witnesses are not muzzled by an agreement among
parties. And the Supreme Court has held that even a state court
injunction barring a witness from testifying in future cases is not
entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of other states."
72 See supra Part I.B.
" Luban, supra note 2, at 2650 ("Among the products whose defects are
alleged to have been hidden by protective orders or sealed settlements are Dow
Coming's silicone gel breast implants; pickup trucks made by Ford and General
Motors; Upjohn's sleeping pill Halcion; Pfizer's Bjork-Shiley heart valves; and
McNeil Pharmaceutical's painkiller, Zomax.").
74 Luban, supra note 2, at 2649 (noting that manufacturers, in order to keep
discovery materials sealed and out of the public eye, often prefer to exchange
generous settlements for claimants' pledges of secrecy).
7' Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 240-241 (1998) (holding
the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not impede a witness from testifying in a
different state against auto manufacturer despite an injunction issued against his
testimony by a Michigan county court pursuant to agreement between the
parties).
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Perhaps more important, a careful look at the instances cited as
examples of improper protection of secret hazards do not support
the notion that they are being hidden by court action. At the 1994
hearings76 on a bill to limit the discretion of the federal courts
with regard to protection of information relating to dangers to the
public health and safety, a number of "witnesses" testified
regarding how court protection had endangered the public or had
resulted in injuries or death to family members. It was clear,
however, that these were individuals who were angry over the fate
of their loved ones and were frustrated by their inability to
somehow further castigate the wrongdoers. One case involved
medical malpractice regarding the birth of the "witnesses"' child.
There was no evidence that there were future dangers to the health
of the public because in their particular case the delivery of their
child might have been badly botched.77 The implication of this
"testimony" is that a confidentiality clause in a settlement agree-
ment of a professional malpractice case should never be approved
because one unfortunate mistake would reveal per se a danger to
the public. Indeed, it would follow that the court could not approve
a confidentiality agreement in many cases: for example, if a
defendant has been charged with negligent operation of his or her
vehicle, a court would not approve the confidentiality agreement as
one negligent act might be the precursor of others.
In a second situation,78 the death of a driver was related to a
defective vehicle design. The argument was to the effect that had
there not been protective orders in prior cases involving the same
type of vehicle, the death would have been avoided. There had
been substantial publicity,79 however, about the dangers long
76 See Hearings, supra note 6.
77 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 6-7 (prepared statement of Mr. and Mrs.
Doe).
78 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 13-14 (statement of Leonard and Arleen
Schmidt).
71 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 45 (statement of Elizabeth du Fresne noting
that in 1977 and again in 1978, the National Highway and Transportation Safety
Commission had issued consumer advisories concerning the problem and in 1978
a major news network had carried a prime time story about the dangers;
moreover, the manufacturer had established a public reading room with ample
information about the situation).
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before the driver had obtained the vehicle in 1984, some nine years
after its original sale. In 1980, the United States Department of
Transportation, rather than requiring a recall of the vehicles,
permitted the manufacturer to issue warning sticker notices to
owners who had originally purchased the vehicles.8 ° Of course the
information did not directly reach individuals who bought a used
vehicle, but such a person would not be any more likely to obtain
notice of the dangers because of unrestricted access to evidence
developed in a lawsuit. If there was fault, it was the failure of the
governmental agencies who knew of the dangers and the members
of the media who did not adequately publicize the information
available to them. There was nothing to support the notion that the
existence of protective orders made the slightest difference as to
public awareness of the dangers.
One of the more publicized and cited 8' examples of harm to
the public due to confidentiality orders is that of the breast implant
case brought by Maria Stern against the Dow Coming Company.
It is alleged that had there not been a confidentiality order in that
case, thousands of women would have been warned about the
alleged dangers of breast implants and could have avoided personal
tragedy.82 However, that case was publicly tried before a jury that
awarded plaintiff $211,000 in actual damages and a $1.5 million
punitive award. On November 5, 1984, the day of the decision, a
United Press International news release provided details as to the
name and home city of the plaintiff, the identity of the defendant
corporation, the amounts of the jury award, the basis of plaintiff's
claim, and the nature of her injuries. Apparently the decision
sparked little interest. If a public trial and a news release regarding
the dangers of breast implants and a huge punitive damage award
were ignored, it is difficult to believe that the mere absence of a
limitation on disclosure of specific items of evidence would have
made a difference.
80 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 13-14.
s See Luban, supra note 2, at 2652 (discussing use of confidentiality orders
in tobacco litigation as potentially harmful to the public interest); Zitrin, supra
note 2, at 121; see also Hearings, supra note 6, at 9-10 (prepared statement of
sybil Niden Goldrich).
82 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 9-10.
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Professor Arthur Miller has analyzed a number of other similar
situations in which protective orders were blamed for harm due to
dangerous situations.83 In each case, the protective order proved
to be a scapegoat rather than a cause. To be sure, advocates of
statutes limiting protective orders have cited a few other situa-
tions8' although the facts as to the existence of publicity are not
provided. In any event, it can legitimately be argued that the
settlements tend to protect defendants from the presentation of
evidence in subsequent lawsuits, not to eliminate disclosure in the
media and elsewhere of the existence of a hazard. Despite the fact
that the allegations of a secrecy crisis have been heard and debated
for many years, there are no empirical studies that support the
notion that confidentiality agreements have been a serious cause of
danger to the public.85
There are legitimate advantages to confidentiality agreements.
Therefore, without a firm showing that a serious problem exists,
the adoption of a statute that restricts such agreements and their
enforcement and also forces courts routinely to conduct contested
hearings regarding evidence that could possibly be relevant to risks
to public health or safety, seems extremely unwise. The difficulties
are exacerbated by uncertainties as to what is and what is not a
danger to public health or safety. Suppose that in discovery during
a routine automobile accident case the plaintiff's state of health
prior to his injuries is raised and information is developed showing
that plaintiff was HIV positive or suffered from AIDS. Does this
reveal a potential danger to public health? Scholars may dis-
agree.86 However, under a liberal "relevancy" standard, the court
would have to make a determination in the case that the need for
protection clearly outweighs the danger. Even with the recognition
that sexual contact is not the only way of contracting HIV, a
plaintiff might have to establish his or her safe sexual habits that
83 See Miller, supra note 2, at 480-82.
" See Zitrin, supra note 2, at 119-121.
85 Dore, supra note 2, at 301-02.
86 Cf. Luban, supra note 2, at 2654 (arguing that a plaintiff with AIDS is not
a public health and safety concern); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 2, at 2684
(proposing a balancing approach to assess the plaintiffs privacy interests
weighed against the "public and system needs").
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would have prevented exposure. Or consider a case by an employee
against an employer, alleging a dangerous work environment, in
which fellow employees are deposed. The latter can suffer serious
harm from disclosure of personal information, even though that
information would not have been admissible had the case not
settled and gone to trial.87 And what about a products liability
case in which a settlement is reached but the defendant stoutly
contests the fact that its product is in any way unsafe, claiming that
settlement was cheaper than a prolonged fight on the merits with
a great amount of negative publicity? Does the court, in deciding
whether to honor a confidentiality clause in the settlement agree-
ment, have to decide the liability issue? To do its job properly, the
court would have to hear from experts and other witnesses. Much
of the value of the settlement would be lost, and the cost in time
and energy of the court as well as the parties could be substantial.
There would be an enormous burden on the judicial system if
extensive inquiry were required of courts any time a confidentiality
agreement was presented for approval.88 Of course such problems
would be eliminated if the legislation adopted a proposal similar to
the Washington statute, where a mere "allegation" that health or
safety is involved appears to be enough to preclude enforcement of
a confidentiality order in most cases.89 However, such a provision
cannot be justified because it places a "club" in the hands of the
media or anyone else who wished to obtain private information
regardless of the circumstances.
None of this means, of course, that a court should enforce and
support a confidentiality provision agreed to by the parties in a
case regardless of a real danger to the public health or safety. But
the presumption should be on the side of privacy. Moreover, the
court should not merely reject completely a confidentiality
provision. It should remove restrictions that could affect proper
notice to the public of danger, but not necessarily allow public
access to the fruits of discovery themselves.
87 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 45 (statement of Elizabeth du Fresne).
88 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 34 (prepared statement of Judge Joseph S.
Weis).
" WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4.24.601, 611 (West Supp. 2000).
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A third argument favoring disclosure is based on the fact that
discovery in a case that uncovers important information may be of
great significance in subsequent cases based upon closely identical
situations. It is the desire for such information that appears to be
behind the claims regarding hazards to public health and safety. To
attorneys, primarily those who represent plaintiffs in products
liability actions, the easier it is to obtain useful information
developed in other cases, the better it is. It is much easier,
however, to "sell" a proposed statute limiting privacy if public
protection appears to be at stake rather than benefits to plaintiffs
and their attorneys. Thus, with one notable exception,9" state
provisions that have been enacted, 9' as well as the proposed
federal statute,92 do not deal with the evidence sharing issue.
Nevertheless, the argument for sharing evidence has substantial
merit. It is wasteful and inefficient to force parties in subsequent
cases to retrace the steps taken in an earlier case, particularly when
those steps are costly and time consuming. It is not surprising,
therefore, that courts93 as well as commentators,94 including
some who have generally favored upholding confidentiality agree-
ments, 95 have supported modification of protective orders to
permit information sharing in appropriate circumstances.96 A line
must be drawn between mere "fishing expeditions"97 and serious
90 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000). "A protective order issued
to prevent disclosure of materials or information related to a personal injury
action or action for wrongful death produced in discovery ... shall not prohibit
an attorney from voluntarily sharing such materials or information with an
attorney involved in a similar or related matter." Id.
9' FLA. STAT. ANN. § 69.081 (West 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4.24.601, 611 (West Supp. 2000); TEx. R. Civ, P. 76a.
92 S. 957, 106th Cong., 1st Sess., May 4, 1999.
9 3See e.g., EEOC v. National Children's Ctr., Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1048 (D.C.
Cir. 1998); Wolhar v. General Motors Corp., 712 A.2d 464, 467 & n.8 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1997) (citing numerous cases).
94 For an excellent and comprehensive discussion, see Dore, supra note 2,
at 363-68 (citing cases as well as commentators).
95 See Marcus, supra note 2; Miller, supra note 2.
96 See Richard L. Marcus, Myth and Reality in Protective Order Litigation,
69 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 41-46 (1983); Miller, supra note 2, at 497-99.
97 Dore, supra note 2, at 367.
SECRECY AND CIVIL JUSTICE
attempts to obtain information that otherwise might not be
available98 or would be costly and time consuming to duplicate.
Once again, however, any provision that mandates evidence sharing
should be carefully drawn to achieve its purpose without unduly
upsetting the interests of the parties arrived at through a settlement
arrangement. The one state statute that specifically addresses the
matter is quite conservative:
A protective order issued to prevent disclosure of materials
or information related to a personal injury action or action
for wrongful death produced in discovery in any cause
shall not prohibit an attorney from voluntarily sharing such
materials or information with an attorney involved in a
similar or related matter, with the permission of the court,
after notice and opportunity to be heard to any party or
person protected by the protective order, and provided the
attorney who receives the material or information agrees,
in writing, to be bound by the terms of the protective
order."
It would seem proper to go beyond the terms of such a statute
and leave to the court, regardless of the willingness of the party or
attorney who is in possession of the desired information, the power
to allow disclosure in cases of substantial need, provided that
measures are taken to maximize protection of privacy. This means,
of course, that the court could, in proper circumstances, permit a
party in a subsequent case to inquire into the existence in the prior
case of any highly relevant secret information. Thus a defendant
would not be able, through a settlement and protective order, to
hide a "smoking gun" found, essentially by chance, by one
plaintiff, and unlikely to be uncovered by others with identical
claims.
An interesting aspect of the prohibition on the use of discovery
in subsequent cases involves clauses in settlement agreements that
would prohibit the attorney for one side, invariably the plaintiff's
lawyer, from bringing identical suits on behalf of other plaintiffs
98 This might be the situation if a deponent in an earlier, settled case has
since died.
99 VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-420.01 (Michie 2000).
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against the same defendant. Such provisions are generally consid-
ered unethical. Thus, Rule 5.6 of the American Bar Association's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall not
participate in offering or making: ... an agreement in which a
restriction on the lawyer's right to practice is part of the settlement
of a controversy between private parties. ' ' l °
It is felt that it is improper for such defendants to "buy off'
attorneys whose experience and talent make them the best available
to represent subsequent plaintiffs.10 1 Nevertheless, some courts
distinguish between restrictions on a lawyer's right to practice and
his or her commitment not to reveal information about the initial
case or to use the information in other cases. The latter is not
considered an ethical violation. 0 2 Moreover, a number of courts
have disqualified attorneys from participating in subsequent cases,
despite ethical restrictions, based upon the contractual agreements,
leaving the question of ethics to be determined by the disciplinary
authorities. 10 3 These decisions enforce the notion that in the
absence of a court determination to the contrary, the protection of
the privacy of litigants outweighs disclosure of material deemed
confidential in settlement agreements.
D. Arguments Favoring Limitations
There are a number of fundamental arguments made in favor of
permitting confidentiality agreements. First, many believe that
individual privacy is valuable in and of itself. It should be
remembered that defendants are not in court voluntarily; they are
coerced by governmental regulation. Hence, care should be taken
100 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.6.
101 92 ABA Comm. on Prof 1 Ethics and Profl Responsibility, Formal Op.
93-371 (1993) (discussing the rationale behind Model Rule 5.6).
102 id.
103 Id. Contra Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Philip Morris, Inc., 53 F. Supp.
2d 338, 344-47 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (disqualifying a law firm that violated an
agreement with an insurance company to exclude itself from the case); Jarvis v.
Jarvis, 758 P.2d 244, 246 (Kan. Ct. App. 1988) (deeming such an agreement
void as against public policy); Feldman v. Minars, 658 N.Y.S.2d 614, 617 (App.
Div. 1997) (disqualifying law firm that solicited plaintiff in breach of Illinois
settlement agreement).
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not to overextend that power. An argument can be made that
plaintiffs are also coerced; but for the improper actions of the
defendants, they would not have had to go to court. And, of course,
witnesses who may have no stake whatsoever in the outcome of a
case, are certainly entitled to as much privacy as the system can
afford.
Second, it is claimed that settlement of cases would be inhibited
if parties could not include confidentiality clauses in their settle-
ment agreements. Settlements are an important aspect of our
dispute resolution system. Our courts are choked with cases as it
is,"°4 and if it were not for the fact that the vast number of cases
settle, parties on both sides often prefer resolution without trial. In
the typical case in which a plaintiff is seeking compensation for
some alleged loss due to fault on the part of the defendant, the
plaintiff, more often than not, wants the money at once, 10 5 even
if the chances for an ultimate victory are high. And, of course, the
risk of a loss can be too much to bear. A defendant is often
anxious to keep the case as quiet as possible. 1°6 It does not want
any unfavorable information to be made public, even if it believes
that it would prevail if a trial were to take place. It certainly does
not want other potential plaintiffs to be encouraged to file similar
suits. But if the unfavorable information is to be made public, then
defendant might believe it is better off fighting the case to the
bitter end.
From a practical view, however, it seems unlikely that even a
total ban on confidentiality provisions would be a major deterrent
to settlement. Plaintiffs would still want their money as soon as
they could get it and without risk of a loss at trial. Defendants
would still want to avoid trial in order to limit dissemination of bad
'04 Miller, supra note 2, at 487 ("[S]tate courts are experiencing difficulty
in keeping up with the inflow of new cases . . . Our judges cannot assume
additional tasks of the size that an expansion of the public's right of access would
generate").
105 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 43 (statement of Gerry Spence).
'06 See Hearings, supra note 6, at 43. Here, Mr. Spence stated that in forty
years of practice he had encountered no situation in which a settlement did not
include a term prohibiting disclosure of the terms of the settlement and the
surrounding facts. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 43.
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publicity as much as possible. Moreover, in situations in which
subsequent suits on identical facts would be likely, defendants
would want to avoid potential liability in easy-to-win actions based
on offensive issue estoppel.'0 7 In most situations, they would be
better off settling cases one by one, since even a victory in a first
trial would not afford them an estoppel defense in subsequent
actions.
If confidentiality provisions were not honored, the dynamics of
settlement would be somewhat changed, generally in favor of
plaintiffs. °8 Defendants would often be eager to arrive at an
agreement early in the case before extensive discovery or even
before a case is filed. They would be more likely to push for
alternate dispute resolution of suits. Except in those cases in which
plaintiff would have its own interests in privacy, plaintiffs would
gain some leverage. On the other hand, an agreement to a protec-
tive order is a significant "bargaining chip" for plaintiffs. It is
something that they can give in exchange for a more favorable
monetary amount. Without it, plaintiffs might have to settle for
somewhat less.
To some extent, uncertainty as to whether courts will or will
not refuse to support protective provisions would be worse than a
total ban. Parties need to know at the outset of their negotiations
where they stand. If anything would be likely to inhibit settlement,
it would be doubt about enforcement of a potential agreement. It
would cause parties initially to avoid disclosure of sensitive
information whenever possible. Although we cannot eliminate
uncertainty as to when disclosure will be permitted, we could
certainly cut it back by taking the position that there is a presump-
tion favoring enforcement of privacy settlement clauses.
Third, without the ability to arrange a confidentiality agreement
that the parties could reasonably expect to be enforced, the scope
of discovery itself would likely be affected in a number of cases.
Since 1938 when the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure went into
'0' See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
108 Typically plaintiffs' attorneys strongly approve of provisions limiting
confidentiality agreements. See Hearings, supra note 6, at 42-43 (statement of
Gerry Spence).
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effect, broad ranging discovery 1° 9 has become the norm as state
after state has patterned its provisions after the liberal federal
rules."' Broad discovery is all to the good in ensuring that
parties have available the information they need to build their
cases. As already noted, however, defendants and witnesses, if not
plaintiffs as well, have a strong argument for privacy. The scope
of discovery requires disclosure of matters not admissible at trial.
There is, therefore, ample opportunity for serious abuse. Revelation
of information learned during the course of discovery, but not
admissible in evidence, can, if not subject to protection, seriously
disrupt one's life. Courts do have the power, in their discretion, to
restrict the scope of discovery to avoid such abuses. If they cannot
avoid problems through the use of protective orders, they are more
likely to do so by curtailing discovery at the outset."' Moreover,
even without court interference, discovery might well be limited
because parties will be reluctant to come forward voluntarily with
anything that might be damaging if it were to become public."
12
The value of cooperation with regard to discovery should not be
underestimated. The cost to the parties and the legal system of
continuous fights over what discovery is or is not appropriate can
be high and disheartening.
III. CONCLUSIONS
The following set of principles should operate with respect to
disclosure of information discovered during the course of litigation:
1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c), with its "good cause"
requirement, should apply only in situations in which a party
unilaterally seeks protections prior to or during discovery. It should
'09 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). "Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the
pending action ... The information sought need not be admissible at the trial if
the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence." Id.
"' See FRIEDENTHAL, supra note 27, at 386.
u. See Miller, supra note 2, at 476-77.
112 Miller, supra note 2, at 483-84.
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not apply to subsequent agreements among parties to maintain
privacy.
2. As to materials subject to protection in an agreement among
parties when those materials have not been used at trial or on
motion to obtain a substantive decision, there should be a presump-
tion of nondisclosure. The current situation, whereby some courts
routinely approve such provisions, is sensible. Only if an issue is
raised as to the justification of such a provision in a particular
situation, or if the court itself believes that an inquiry should be
made, should the court be required to take the time and energy to
make an evaluation and then the burden should be on those who
seek disclosure.
3. As to materials subject to a protective agreement among the
parties when such materials have been presented at trial or to the
court in support of a substantive determination, the presumption
should shift, and the court should be required to make a finding
that the needs of privacy outweigh the needs for public access. The
situation should be treated in the same way as the courts would
treat a unilateral motion to seal court records.
4. A special exception to the general rule in conclusion two,
above, should obtain upon a showing by or on behalf of a party in
a different lawsuit that materials in the present suit contain
information significant to the fair resolution of the other lawsuit
and that such information is not likely to be discovered without
undue cost and effort. Although the presumption should shift in
favor of disclosure upon such a showing, the court should neverthe-
less evaluate the entire situation to make certain that disclosure is
not outweighed by reasons for confidentiality, and steps should be
taken to restrict the use of the information beyond its need for the
other lawsuit.
5. In a case involving the propriety of the actions of a govern-
ment entity or its employees operating in the scope of their
employment, information as to such actions should be open to
public scrutiny, except when disclosure is objected to as seriously
unfair to non-governmental parties or witnesses.
Hopefully, both federal and state courts can be united in
support of such principles. Differences in treatment among courts
are not sound. Neither the possibility of protection nor a threat of
disclosure should become a motivation for forum shopping.
Sheila L. Birnbaum*
If every judge was of the same caliber as the federal judges we
have in this room, I would have less of a problem allowing them
more discretion to decide privacy issues related to civil litigation.
A real question exists as to whether, in fact, there were sealing
orders occurring that deprived the public of safety information. I
am aware of little empirical evidence to support this proposition.
I represented one of the national defendants, Dow Coming,1 in
breast implant litigation. After paying billions of dollars to resolve
the dispute, Dow had to file Chapter 11. 2 If one has continued to
follow this issue, one knows that health effects relating to breast
implants are, in most instances, no longer a problem.3 There is an
overwhelming scientific consensus that no relationship exists, as
alleged, between silicone breast implants, the gel in silicone breast
implants, and auto-immune disease.4
The question, however, remains: was there a health effect? How
does a judge determine a health risk from the use of a product?
Discovery, settlement and trial are the three areas where privacy
issues arise.
With respect to trials, privacy issues are easy to resolve. Trials
are open to the public. If the litigation includes discussions of trade
secrets or confidential information, the judge can address those
Member, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, LLP.
See, e.g., D'Augustino v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb, 980 F. Supp. 1452 (M.D.
Fla. 1997).
2 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1994).
3 For a general discussion and survey of recent medical studies relating to
breast implants, see Breast Implants - An Information Update - 2000, available
at http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/breastimplants/indexbip.PDF [hereinafter Breast
Implant Update].
4 See Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L. J.
2049, 2066 (2000) (noting "that there was no established correlation between
breast implants and connective tissue disease") (footnote omitted); see also
Breast Implant Update, supra note 3, at 30 ("Individual cases alone cannot
scientifically prove or disprove a connection between [connective tissue disease]
and related disorders and breast implants.").
JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
issues separately. Once a case is tried in a civil forum, however, it
is in the public domain. I am unaware of any civil case in the
product liability or mass tort area that was not publicly tried.
What, then, are the real issues relating to privacy in civil
litigation? One generally refers to broad-ranging discovery, where
plaintiffs can sort through a company's documents at will. For
example, in many federal district courts, there are local rules
requiring litigants to automatically produce all documents that
substantially bear on a claim or defense.5
Such rules raise a number of ancillary issues. For instance, how
many corporate documents bearing on a claim or defense must
litigants automatically disclose? There may be a substantial number
of documents containing trade secrets and confidential information
that should be protected and kept out of the public domain. Why
should these documents be in the public domain? What is the
purpose of all this openness?
Many high profile cases are now tried in the media. The
plaintiff's motivation in seeking publicity is to coax the defendant
to settle before allowing an opportunity to try the merits of the
case. This creates enormous adverse stress on the company. One
effective method of achieving these results is through use of the
media. During the discovery phase of litigation, there is a great
deal of pressure to prevent document protection through confidenti-
ality agreements so that certain documents can be leaked to the
media.
Litigants have, in some instances, been very successful in using
the media. Anyone who has been involved in an issue receiving
media attention may have experienced a disconnect between what
was reported and what actually occurred. I have heard one thing
said at trial but read a completely different version in the newspa-
per. Additionally, it is often difficult to present a balanced media
presentation in a newspaper article. On occasion, it takes much
longer for the defendant to tell its side of the story than for the
5 See, e.g., LOCAL Civ. R. 26 (E.D. Tex.). The Texas local rule provides
that, without awaiting a discovery request, each party shall disclose "all
documents, data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody or
control of the party that are likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense."
Id. (emphasis added).
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plaintiff to do the same. The plaintiff often presents one document,
which on its face looks very bad. When the defendant, however,
explains it or produces other documents to put it into context, the
document is actually not detrimental to the defense. From the point
of view of the media, however, it is often too complicated to tell
the whole story.
We should not be trying cases in the media. On the other hand,
courts are not going to hold civil trials in secrecy. One way to
prevent a case from being tried in the media is to issue protective
orders during the discovery phase of litigation.6 There is no good
reason why such orders should not be granted. It is not in the best
interests of the parties or the court to have documents given to the
media or other parties in piecemeal fashion prior to trial, especially
if they contain confidential information and trade secrets.
The issue of whether safety concerns arise from civil litigation
begs the question as to who makes this determination. How does
the court make this determination? Does the judge have to preside
over an entire trial, bringing in all the parties' experts to determine
whether there truly is a health hazard? This question is one that
juries decide, perhaps after a full determination of all the evidence.
I realize that problems often exist when juries make these deci-
sions, and appellate courts must resolve these issues. Yet how is
the judge to make this determination and on what kind of record?
There are federal agencies that regulate many industries. The
idea that governmental agencies are not investigating safety issues
and are hiding problems with products, drugs, or medical devices
because they settled a few cases in secrecy is not realistic.
Trial lawyers are very communicative people. They have
organized groups, they belong to organizations, and they trade
information.7 Cases are not litigated in secrecy. Instead, they are
6 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides: "Upon motion by a
party or by the person from whom discovery is sought... and for good cause
shown, the court in which the action is pending... may make any order which
justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense." Id.
7 The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, for example, is an
association dedicated to promoting the right to trial by jury. See Your Guide to
ATLA, available at http://www.atla.org/info/guide.ht. The Trial Lawyers for
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litigated in open courtrooms, and confidential or sensitive docu-
ments and records are protected.
Settlements occur on a regular basis in this country under
confidentiality orders. There are many reasons to settle cases.
Defendants are not necessarily settling cases because their products
destroy peoples' lives and limbs. The reality is, if that were
occurring, a company could not keep dangerous products in the
marketplace. These things just cannot be kept secret in our media
conscious world.
There are very good reasons why defendants try to keep their
settlements confidential. I am not sure how effective they have
been. In many instances defendants are unsuccessful because of the
considerable communications that exist among plaintiffs' lawyers.
Settlements are very important to our judicial system. Without them
the system would collapse. We should do everything we can to
encourage settlement. If we do not permit defendants to settle
without revealing the amounts of the settlement, there will be a
chilling effect on settlements to the detriment of the civil justice
system.
Public Justice, moreover, has as its goal the enforcement of consumer rights. See
TLPJ Mission Statement, available at http://www.tlpj.org/tlpjf/ground.htm.
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Harvey Weitz*
My position on secrecy agreements is straightforward: secrecy
agreements should be considered null, void, and unenforceable.
They are anathema to the public good. I can cite a number of
personal experiences where the sole purpose of a secrecy agree-
ment was to suppress information that would be of value to other
litigants as well as to the general public. Without enforcement, our
state and federal regulations amount to nothing more than self-
policing and self-reporting measures.
Some time ago, I represented a woman who was seriously
injured when her General Motors ("GM") automobile "ran away
from her." Through the use of an on-line exchange provided by the
Association of Trial Lawyers of America ("ATLA"),' I learned
that a friend in Arizona had handled a similar matter where the
accident was caused by defective engine mounts.2 I called him
soon after and asked for some details about his case, but he replied,
"I can't discuss it." I told him that his name appeared on the
ATLA Exchange in connection with an engine mount accident. He
reiterated that he could not discuss the matter, and when I asked,
Member, Schneider, Kleinick, Weitz, Damashek & Shoot.
The Association of Trial Lawyers of America Exchange is an on-line
members-only litigation service that provides plaintiffs access to trial litigation
information including experts, deposition testimony, various pleadings and other
court documents, and speaker papers and articles. See ATLA Exchange, at
http://exchange.atla.org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2000). Legal information is provided
via a series of searchable databases, including: directories of ATLA lawyers who
requested searches from the Exchange; case abstracts that track verdicts;
settlements and rulings in areas of law that are of interest to ATLA members;
lists of legal and technical journals, books, government publications, and other
resources; lists of ATLA members' experience with plaintiff and defense experts;
lists describing instances of discovery abuse encountered by ATLA members;
and depositions retained on experts and corporate representatives. Id.
2 Embry v. General Motors Corp., 565 P.2d 1294, 1297 (Ariz. 1977)
(holding that defendant did not have an obligation to warn of an alleged design
defect in a wrongful death action where there was no allegation that the
automobile was constructed and designed with defects).
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"Why not?", he replied that he had signed a secrecy agreement and
agreed not to talk to anyone about the case. I suggested that since
I already knew he had commenced the action, I did not really need
to speak with him; all I needed was the discovery file. "Sorry," he
said, "I had to return everything to the defendant when the case
was disposed of."
Contrast these events with a recent case I handled where the
defense claimed that their product design department had not even
undertaken a failure analysis of its forklift design. Fortunately, I
had obtained a product failure analysis by that same defendant
from the case file of an attorney in another jurisdiction where a
settlement was reached without a secrecy agreement.
Generally, when defense counsel ask for secrecy agreements, it
indicates to me that his client wishes to cover up or impede an
investigation of the defective product. If my client desires a
settlement, I try to negotiate a "will not seek publicity" agreement.
This is an agreement that allows me to answer inquiries about the
lawsuit, but requires that I do not report the settlement.
Sometimes these agreements are termed "confidential" so as to
imply that the company desires to avoid adverse publicity. This is
not the case. I have a broad range of litigation experience, and I
have never seen a case settled by a defendant because it was afraid
of publicity. I have tried scores of medical malpractice cases,
dozens of product liability lawsuits, and a multitude of cases
involving physical assaults ranging from molestation to rape. From
these, I have found it is always the defendant who asks for secrecy
as a part of the settlement. Moreover, I have never seen a defen-
dant ask for an anonymous caption in order to protect its name
while it mounts a defense to plaintiff's claims.
Recently I had the privilege of representing the State of New
York in its tobacco litigation.3 The big tobacco companies had
engaged in a scandalous conspiracy through two front organizations
known as the Tobacco Institute and the Council on Tobacco
3 New York v. Philip Morris, Inc., 686 N.Y.S.2d 564, 573 (Sup. Ct. 1998)
(approving settlement in suit against tobacco company arising out of tobacco
related illnesses suffered by Medicaid recipients and New York State employees).
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Research. 4 If it were not for the open pre-trial discovery of
industry documents by plaintiff's counsel, which disgorged a
plethora of documents, this conspiracy might still be on-going. If
secrecy orders had been in place in this instance, they would have
only served to conceal the truth. Fortunately, through the open pre-
trial discovery, our courts exposed the true nature of tobacco's
health menace. If this conspiracy had not been exposed by the
courts, many more people would have been at risk of death by
cigarettes. This is just one example that revealing the truth is the
greatest service courts can offer the public.
There should be no question that the courts belong to the
public, but who is the public? Myself and everyone in this room?
I am an individual who wants to decide for myself whether there
is harm in a product. Defense counsel typically make credible and
persuasive arguments concerning an "overwhelming scientific
body" of work that concludes, for example, that silicone implants
are safe. Nonetheless, there exists a huge body of anecdotal
evidence concerning the lack of safety of those products. With
slight alterations, these remarks would make a great opening for a
defendant in a product liability lawsuit. I myself have handled a
number of silicone breast implant cases.' Just this week I visited
a plastic surgeon in connection with a cosmetic injury case, and we
just happened to talk about breast implants. Despite everything that
has been written in defense of breast implants, the surgeon
commented, "Yes, I know all about those studies, but it is interes-
ting because every time I remove the implants, the patient gets
better." Consumers want to know specifically about the product
claims. They are aware that much of the "scientific" information
4 The Council for Tobacco Research - U.S.A. (formerly the Tobacco
Industry Research Committee) is an organization formed jointly by several
tobacco companies in 1954. See STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., SMOKING AND
DISEASE: THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S EARLIEST RESPONSES (1996), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/cigpapers/book/chapter2/5.html. The tobacco
industry's stated purpose in creating the council was to fund independent
scientific research to determine whether scientific reports linking smoking and
lung cancer were true. Id. However, there are documents that show that the
council was formed for public relations purposes, in order to convince the public
that the hazards of smoking had not been definitively proven. Id.
' See, e.g., In re Breast Implant Litig., 656 N.Y.S.2d 97 (Sup. Ct. 1997).
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that has been produced has been financed by the industry and
revealed selectively. The public wants to hear from both sides of
the controversy and then decide for itself.
I have handled cases in which federal agencies were involved,
where their efforts fell short in getting information out. For
example, in dealing with the engine mounts in the GM case, the
Consumer Products Safety Commission ("CPSC")6 made an
inquiry of GM as to an engine mounts part with a certain serial
number. The CPSC wanted to know all about the number of cases
involving that specific part. GM responded in writing that there
were only a few claims, and all were without merit. This response
was accepted by the CPSC. As it turns out, the same part bore a
different serial number in various GM product lines and those
automobiles suffered many such failures. Consequently, what GM
did in answering the CPSC was to hide all of the other failures of
that very same product. Litigation eventually uncovered the truth.
The CPSC is underfunded, understaffed, and in need of
assistance. Open courtrooms will assist the agency in discovering
information corporate defendants wish to hide and reveal it to the
public. Open courts, therefore, play a vital role in ensuring safety.
Only a very small number of cases actually come to the CPSC's
attention. Moreover, the rule-making process favors industry.
Before a regulation is adopted, industry representatives develop the
proposal and ultimately shape the final regulation through their
input. In some well-known instances, such as gas tank protection,
6 The CPSC is an independent federal regulatory agency that was created by
Congress in 1972 arising from the Consumer Product Safety Act. See CPCS -
Who we are - What we do for you, available at, http://www.cpsc.gov-
/cpscpub/pubs/103.html. The commission has jurisdiction over 15,000 types of
consumer products. Id. The mission of the CPSC is to inform the public about
product hazards and to reduce the risk of injuries and deaths from consumer
products by developing voluntary industry standards including: issuing and
enforcing mandatory standards; banning consumer products if no feasible
standard would adequately protect the public; obtaining the recall of products or
arranging for their repair; conducting research on potential product hazards;
informing and educating consumers through the media, state and local
governments and private organizations; and by responding to consumer inquiries.
Id.
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the automobile industry prevented the adoption of effective
regulations.
We cannot rely on the federal government or federal and state
agencies to protect us. We have to rely on ourselves. My basic
belief, very much like Judge Weinstein's, is that the courts belong
to the public. We pay for the system, and we serve in it. Every one
of us may now be summoned to serve as a juror. As citizens, we
have a right to know what goes on in our courts. When courts are
open, and people know they are open, there is a greater respect for
the judicial system. Decisions openly arrived at elevate the court's
esteem and serve a great public good.7
It is understandable that a company would wish to keep a
proprietary formula secret. I also can understand why a company
would want to keep costs and sales figures secret as well. I can
also understand privacy in matters relating to adoption, divorce,
and other intra-family disputes. With those limited exceptions in
mind, I fail to see the benefit to the public of secrecy in other
matters. I wish to reiterate my earlier point that I have never seen
a case settled because a party wanted to avoid the publicity a trial
may bring. I have, in fact, tried cases where manufacturers have
spent more money defending the case than it would have taken to
settle the case.
Finally, today, there is a tremendous amount of distrust of
government. The best and most accessible place where one may see
the government at work is in open court. There is no reason to seal
the courtrooms.
7 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 578 (1980).
People assemble in public places not only to speak or to take action,
but also to listen, observe, and learn ... a trial courtroom also is a
public place where the people generally - and representatives of the
media - have a right to be present, and where their presence historical-
ly has been thought to enhance the integrity and quality of what takes
place.
Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).

